Daniel Chand

Kent State University
Political Science

Kent State University
PO Box 5190
Kent, OH
United States
44242
dchand@kent.edu |  Visit Personal Website


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Daniel E. Chand’s research has broadly related to two topics: 1) policy implementation, specifically focusing on immigration; and 2) nonprofits in the policy process. His work on immigration policy has examined the decision making and discretionary power of various actors, such as immigration judges and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. His nonprofit work has explored how nonprofits influence the policy process through activities such as campaigning and lobbying. He is currently completing a nationwide study of state and federal administrative judges. He has published a number of articles on immigration policy and administrative adjudication in journals such as the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Administration and Society, and Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. His work on nonprofits in the policy process has appeared in Social Science Quarterly, Business and Politics, and The Forum.

Citation:
Chand, Daniel E. and William D. Schreckhise. 2015. “Secure Communities and Community Values: Local Context and Discretionary Immigration Law Enforcement.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(10): 1,621-1,643.
Abstract: In an effort to target dangerous criminals in the United States illegally, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) developed the nationwide deportation programme called Secure Communities. Ostensibly a nationwide programme, the use of this programme instead varies widely across the United States, with some jurisdictions seeing large numbers of deportations, with many others seeing none. Employing ICE deportation data and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, we examine what accounts for this variation. We find that local political attitudes play a role, with Republican-leaning jurisdictions and those in states that support restrictive state-level immigration witnessing more deportations. Perhaps surprisingly, jurisdictions with the most crime actually saw fewer. These dynamics were similar for models predicting both the number of deportations of individuals with criminal records and those without them. Instead of being driven by a desire to remove high-level criminal undocumented aliens, we conclude instead that the dynamics of this federal immigration enforcement effort are influenced by the local political setting.
URL: https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.library.kent.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2014.986441
Citation:
Chand, Daniel E. 2017 “Lobbying and Nonprofits: Money and Membership Matter – But Not for All.” Social Science Quarterly 98(5): 1,296-1,312.
Abstract: Lobbying by nonprofits is a relatively new topic that has drawn attention from political science scholars and nonprofit managers. Several studies have demonstrated there to be lobbying inequalities among nonprofits, but few have compared lobbying expenditures across groups and none have taken into account how well groups have mobilized. Examining 227 groups that issue legislative “scorecards” over six terms of Congress (1999–2010), the author uses a mix of analysis of variance and regression analysis to determine whether groups with different missions lobby at different levels and whether mobilization factors, such as revenue and membership, can help explain these differences. The author finds that organizational revenue and membership predict how much most groups spend on lobbying. However, this finding does not apply to all groups. Public interest nonprofits lobby at higher levels as both their revenues and memberships increase. But business associations lobby at significantly high levels regardless of how well they mobilize. These results suggest that business associations view lobbying as a more necessary activity for completion of their missions than other tax‐exempt organizations. Many of the most active groups in Washington are small business associations representing “niche” interests. If public interest groups formed around broader social interests are less represented in Washington, as these results suggest, then the voices of large sectors of society, and not just public interest group members, are lost in the policy discussion.
URL: https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.library.kent.edu/doi/full/10.1111/ssqu.12386
Citation:
Chand, Daniel E. 2017. “‘Dark Money’ and ‘Dirty Politics’: Are Anonymous Ads More Negative?” Business and Politics 19(3): 454-481.
Abstract: Many scholars have studied the use of negative advertising in campaigns and what motivates candidates and groups to run negative ads. Recent elections, however, have seen a dramatic increase in advertising by outside groups, particularly by so-called “dark-money” organizations, which do not disclose their donor information. This study questions whether dark-money groups are more likely to engage in negative advertising. By examining the more than 13,000 outside-group expenditures from the 2010 through the 2014 congressional elections, it finds that outside groups are, indeed, more likely to use negative ads when they conceal their donor information. Additionally, while liberal and conservative groups are roughly equally likely to use negative ads, conservative groups are most likely to use anonymously funded negative advertisements. This could be, at least in part, due to the support conservative groups receive from organized businesses, which generally seek to conceal their political activities from public scrutiny.
URL: https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.library.kent.edu/core/journals/business-and-politics/article/dark-money-and-dirty-politics-are-anonymous-ads-more-negative/9BFE3895A4B5B1EFEAED99EB1145CE2C
Citation:
Chand, Daniel E., William D. Schreckhise, and Marianne Bowers. 2017. “The Dynamics of Local Context and Immigration Asylum Hearing Decisions.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 27(1): 182-196.
Abstract: Immigration judges (IJs) preside over cases related to immigration law, determining whether an individual should be granted asylum. The few prior studies of IJs have focused on factors of interest to judicial politics scholars, such as characteristics of the judge or applicant in a case. Drawing from public administration literature, we add a new set of factors related to local and state context in which the IJ works. Using multilevel regression analysis, we examine the decisions of 245 IJs made from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Indeed, it appears context is important. We find IJs grant asylum less often in communities where citizens more often vote Republican and where the local economy is poor. Judges in states where statewide agencies have opted to participate in the restrictive immigration program 287(g) also granted significantly lower percentages of asylum applications. States with Democratic governors and state legislative majorities granted asylum more often, as do IJs working in United States-Mexico border communities. With respect to traditional factors, judges with more experience and those that hear higher percentages of cases involving individuals from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, grant significantly fewer petitions for asylum. Judges who hear high percentages of petitions from applicants with attorneys grant significantly more asylums.
URL: https://academic-oup-com.proxy.library.kent.edu/jpart/article/27/1/182/2629290
Citation:
Chand, Daniel E. and William D. Schreckhise. 2018. "Independence in Administrative Adjudiciations: When and Why Agency Judges are Subject to Deference and Influence." Administration and Society (online edition available).
Abstract: Are administrative adjudicators subject to external influence and pressures? We present the results from a nationwide survey of agency adjudicators, focusing on immigration judges (IJs) and administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Social Security Administration (SSA). ALJs follow decisional procedures spelled out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and are given substantial legal protections from agency pressures. IJs do not follow APA procedures, nor do they receive its protections. We find IJs give significantly greater deference to the positions of the public, their agency, Congress, and the president, and report more favorable attitudes toward interest groups in adjudications.
URL: http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy.library.kent.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0095399718760593

Substantive Focus:
Law and Policy PRIMARY

Theoretical Focus:
Agenda-Setting, Adoption, and Implementation PRIMARY

Keywords

IMMIGRATION POLICY NONPROFIT ADVOCACY ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION