The role of interest organizations in the policy process with special emphasis on the policy objectives of corporations and trade associations during the regulatory process.
||Godwin, Ken, Edward Lopez, and Barry Seldon. 2006. "Incorporating Politics into Rent Seeking Games." Southern Economic Journal 23:37-54. |
||Provides a formal model of the rent-seeking process that describes how corporations allocate their lobbying resources for public policies along the private-collective good continuum. Ceteris paribus, corporations prefer lobbying for private goods.|
||Godwin, Ken, Scott Ainsworth, and Erik Godwin. 2012. Lobbying and the Policymaking Process: What Interest Groups Want and How They Get It. CQ Press.|
||Interest organizations seek political rents all along the collective-private goods continuum. The strategies groups use to achieve these rents vary with the level of aggregation of the good and with the stage of the policy process. Lobbying regulatory agencies during rulemaking differs substantially from lobbying those same agencies during implementation. Lobbying legislators during agenda setting differs from lobbying during the decision process. In addition, some types of groups are more effective during different policy stages. Lobbying and the Policy Process shows that although neopluralism effectively describes the lobbying for collective goods, the exchange model provides a much better explanation of lobbying for private goods. The book provides a formal model of how interest organizations allocate their resources between private and collective goods.|
Education Policy PRIMARY
Urban Public Policy
Policy Analysis and Evaluation PRIMARY