Professor Fernando Toboso currently works at the University of Valencia, Spain. His research interests are in methodological and epistemological issues regarding analyses of public sector economic issues with special attention to institutional economics contributions. His substantive focus relates with the organization of economic policy tasks and public services provision in federal states, with special attention to multilevel government in Spain.
Besides contributing several chapters to edited collections he has also published widely in English and Spanish refereed journals such as the Cambridge Journal of Economics, the History of Economic Ideas, the European Journal of Law and Economics, the Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, Regional and Federal Studies, El Trimestre Económico, Hacienda Pública Española, etc.
Three of his chapters in English have been published in the books edited by Oppenheimer, M. et al. (2005), Law and Economics. Alternative Economic Approaches to Legal and Regulatory Issues, M.E. Sharpe (he authored chapter 16), Batie, S. et al. (2008), Alternative Institutional Structures: Evolution and Impact, Routledge (he authored chapter 10, whereas Elinor Ostrom authored chapter 3) and Shoffield, N. et al. (2011), Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting, Springer (he authored chapter 6).
Besides presenting his research at national and international conferences as usual, he has delivered several lectures by invitation, has been appointed to several scientific committees and has performed as an external referee for several Spanish and English academic journal such as Regional and Federal Studies, Local Government Studies, Constitutional Political Economy, Publius-The Journal of Federalism, History of Economic Ideas, Revista de Economía Institucional, Hacienda Pública Española, etc.
||How Much Power to Tax do Regional Governments Enjoy in Spain Since the 1996 and 2001 Reforms? F Toboso, E Scorsone Regional and Federal Studies 20 (2), 157-174|
||From 1979 to 1983, a new intermediate level of government was created in Spain. This article focuses on the financial aspects of political decentralization in Spain. How much power to tax do the new regional parliaments and executives enjoy? What other sources of income do they dispose of? Which rules have been settled for regulating their tax and non-tax sources of income? Has fiscal decentralization affected fiscal discipline? Are these governments now financially autonomous? These are the questions addressed. The article shows that, with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre, regional governments were financed mainly through intergovernmental grants during the 1980s and 1990s. However, as a result of several recent reforms, their power to tax as well as their financial autonomy has increased substantially since the mid-1990s, mainly through their participation by law in the revenues of several central taxes (known as ceded taxes) upon which they also enjoy significant regulatory rights. As the ceded taxes mechanism is not a simple revenue-sharing formula in Spain, the article concludes that the Spanish model departs from both the more uniform and top-down German model and the more heterogeneous and competitive one characterizing the taxing rights of the States in US federalism.|
||Key organisational choices for financing regional governments in democratic Spain F Toboso Revista de Analisis Economico, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2006|
||How much power to tax do really enjoy the seventeen new regional governments created in democratic Spain? What other sources of income do they dispose of? Which rules have been implemented for regulating their tax and non-tax sources of income and how are these rules influencing the behaviour of relevant political agents? These are the questions addressed in the present paper. Although no econometric estimation has to my knowledge been provided yet, the arguments and figures provided indicate that the political mobilization and the overspending incentive generated at this level of government must be considered key factors in any explanatory model of the surprising path of growth and development registered in Spain since the mid 1980s. Physical and human capital stocks increased at a spectacular rate so as to substantially narrow the gap, in comparison to European standards, that had been generated over the previous forty years of dictatorship. Public deficits and outstanding public debt remained under control. Spanish per capita real GDP soared from 2,536 Euros in 1980 to 19,456 in 2004.|
||Institutional individualism and institutional change: the search for a middle way mode of explanation F Toboso Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (6), 765-783|
||After noting the lack of enthusiasm of several well-known scholars concerning the adoption of both methodological holism and methodological individualism in its several versions, the present article shows that institutional individualism is a different mode of explanation from both of these and also that it is not the same thing as the so-called Popperian program of situational analysis. Institutional individualism is a mode of explanation that yields non-systemic and non-reductionist explanations at the same time as it
allows for the incorporation into economic theories and models of the many formal and informal institutional aspects surrounding all human interactions, whether these interactions take place within stable structures of legal rules and social norms or whether they attempt to change the said rules and norms.
Finally, the paper shows that it is possible for old institutionalists to make institutional individualist analyses of institutional changes while retaining the remaining methodological assumptions of the school.The same is true for new institutionalists. Some examples are offered from both camps.|
Economic Policy PRIMARY
Comparative Public Policy
Policy Process Theory PRIMARY
Policy Analysis and Evaluation SECONDARY
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS
SPANISH POLITICAL AND FISCAL FEDERALISM