I study collective-action problems in theory, lab, and field settings using quantitative and qualitative empirical methods. Collective-action problems are the heart of many environmental conflicts, and therefore environmental policy is an excellent research setting to study central theoretical issues. My research topics to date include collaborative policy, environmental activism, local government policy, and agricultural best management practices. Each of these situations represents a different type of collective action problem. These situations also feature many phenomena of central interest to political science, such as the role of institutions, political behavior, and policy implementation.
||Lubell, Mark. 2013. "Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Games Framework." Policy Studies Journal 41 (3):537-559.|
||This paper provides an overview of our adaptation of Norton Long's concept of the “ecology of games” into a theoretical framework for analyzing institutional complexity. I discuss the basic concepts of the framework, discuss hypotheses related to fundamental questions in governance and policy, and outline some basic analytical approaches. The conclusion assesses the future prospects of the ecology of games framework, including future research needs for theoretical and empirical development.|
Environmental Policy PRIMARY
Science and Technology Policy
Policy Process Theory PRIMARY
Policy Analysis and Evaluation SECONDARY
NETWORKS PUBLIC POLICY